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ABSTRACT: Discount medical cards have come under increasing scrutiny by regula-
tors and law enforcement officials as a result of mounting consumer-reported prob-
lems. For their study, the authors tested five cards available in the Washington, D.C.,
metro area; interviewed card company representatives, state attorneys general, insur-
ance regulators, and insurance agents; and reviewed court and administrative actions.
While some cards provide a measure of value, other cards were found to have serious
drawbacks, including: high-pressure sales tactics; misleading or inaccurate promotion;
exaggerated claims of savings; difficulty finding participating doctors; and providers
who failed to give cardholders promised discounts. Some discount card companies
are seeking to reform the market through a trade association and voluntary code of
conduct. Still, legislative and regulatory interventions will be needed to protect con-
sumers in an unregulated and growing market.
*    *    *    *    *
Background
Double-digit premium increases over the past four years have made health
insurance unaffordable for many Americans.As an alternative to insurance
coverage, some consumers are turning to discount medical cards, which can
allow the purchaser to obtain services at reduced fees from participating
doctors, hospitals, and other providers. But as reports of a variety of con-
sumer problems—from exaggerated discounts to nonexistent provider net-
works—mount, these cards have come under growing scrutiny from
regulators and law enforcement officials.
To understand the challenges facing consumers, the authors tested five
of the 27 cards advertised in the Washington, D.C., metro area by undergo-
ing the application process, seeking health care services from participating
providers, and then canceling the cards. (Only nine of the 27 products iden-
tified were eligible for study; the other 18 cards could not be studied because
of nonworking telephone numbers, lack of provider discounts, or other rea-
sons.) In addition, the researchers interviewed representatives from companies
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offering discount cards, state attorneys general,
insurance regulators, and insurance agents.They
also reviewed court and administrative actions.
While there are examples of cards providing
value, other cards had serious drawbacks, including:
high-pressure sales tactics; misleading or inaccurate
promotion; exaggerated claims of savings; difficulty
finding participating doctors; and providers who
failed to give cardholders promised discounts.
Some discount card companies are seeking
ways to make the market more reputable by form-
ing a trade association and instituting a voluntary
code of conduct. But with few consumer protec-
tions currently in place, legislative and regulatory
interventions are needed to protect consumers in
an unregulated and growing market.
WHAT ARE DISCOUNT MEDICAL CARDS?
Unlike dental and vision cards, which have been in
existence over a decade, discount medical cards are
relatively new products.1 These cards—also called
discount health plans, discount medical plans, and
discount health cards—promise discounts for a
broad range of providers, including doctors and
hospitals, as well as for laboratory work, surgical
procedures, and other services. In return for the
negotiated discount, members must pay a monthly
fee ranging from about $13 per month to $148 per
month for a single person; usually, there is also a
nonrefundable, one-time enrollment fee, which can
be as high at $200.
Unlike health insurance policies, companies
offering discount cards do not pay medical claims
of the individuals enrolled. Instead, they negotiate
discounts with provider networks or, in some
cases, with providers directly.2 Enrollees are respon-
sible for paying the amount of their claims.To
receive a discounted rate, enrollees must pay for
services in full at the time of service or prior to
receiving care. Some discount medical cards are
linked to payment mechanisms. For instance, one
company requires enrollees to prepay for services
through an escrow account.3 Another offers a
credit card with the discount card to allow
enrollees to charge services they cannot pay for
fully at the time of service.4
A GROWING MARKET
Discount medical cards are growing in prevalence,
partly because of the high prices of and limited
access to private health insurance coverage. In fact,
some small businesses and individuals have enrolled
in discount medical cards after dropping their
health insurance following price hikes.5 Discount
cards are also attractive to people with preexisting
conditions, who cannot obtain individual insurance
or are only eligible for very high-priced policies.6
Cardholders do not have to pass medical under-
writing, pay the same cost regardless of health or
age, and cannot be excluded because of a preexist-
ing condition.
Unfortunately, some consumers may mistak-
enly buy discount cards based on the erroneous
belief that the cards are insurance policies.7
DISCOUNT MEDICAL CARDS:
PROBLEMS FOR CONSUMERS
Marketing/sales • Misleading advertisements
• Disconnected telephone numbers
Purchasing cards • Misleading information and
claims that a discount card
is insurance
• High-pressure sales tactics
• High enrollment fees and high
monthly fees
Using cards • Providers listed in directories
not participating
• Discounts less than promised
• Discounts for uninsured or cash-
paying patients greater than for
cardholders
Canceling cards • Inaccurate information on how
to cancel
• Refund less than promised
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Marketers use insurance terminology like “no
underwriting” and “no preexisting conditions,”
leading people to presume incorrectly that they are
buying insurance.Also, the monthly fee—which
can be as high as the monthly cost for catastrophic
insurance—can mislead people into thinking that
it is actually an insurance premium. Some discount
medical cards, moreover, are sold with accident
insurance coverage that pays medical bills resulting
from an accident; others are sold with hospital
indemnity insurance policies that pay for hospital
stays.8 This bundling of noninsurance and insur-
ance products may cause further confusion.
HOW MANY PEOPLE HAVE A DISCOUNT
MEDICAL CARD?
There are no data on how many people have a
discount medical card, nor are there demographic
data on those enrolled. One large discount card
company reports that nearly 680,000 people have
enrolled in its physician discount program.9
Another company reported more than 81,000
enrollees and $39.3 million in revenue in 2003.10
MARKETING OF CARDS
Companies that administer and manage discount
cards sell their product in three ways: directly to
consumers; through other companies, like associa-
tions; or by independent sales agents (including
insurance agents) and marketing firms.11 One pub-
licly traded company reports that it devotes 37
percent of its operating expenses to sales and mar-
keting, including recruitment and training of an
independent sales force and sales commissions.12
This company uses a technique known as “network
marketing,” under which marketers recruit other mar-
keters and receive commissions based on their sales.13
Unlike insurance agents, promoters of dis-
count cards are generally not regulated or licensed,
meaning that there are few standards that apply to
sales or sales methods. In preparing this issue brief,
the authors reviewed marketing materials that used
scare tactics, misleading information, and exaggera-
tion to attract buyers.The following is an unedited
excerpt from a telemarketing script used to sell
one national card:
At this moment in time you have no insurance
coverage.What if something were to happen to
you or anyone in your family like an accident
that required immediate attention.What if the
closest hospital is a private hospital, as you
know, the first thing that the hospital will asks
[sic] you for is your insurance card.And if you
don’t have any they won’t admit you.They’ll
just tell you to go to the county hospital. Now
there have been nightmares and horror stories
about people dieing [sic] on their way to the
county hospital because they didn’t have insur-
ance. Everyday that you wait is another day
that you don’t have that Emergency Protec-
tion. No one likes to think like this but,What
if you’re one day too late. By enrolling Today
you’ll Never have to say WHAT IF again!!14
Promoters solicit business in a variety of ways,
including advertising on television, radio, and the
Internet, as well as through fax, e-mail, and tele-
marketing.15 Some consumer groups, associations,
retailers, and credit card companies have endorsed
or affiliated themselves with discount card pro-
grams.16 According to an August 2004 article in the
Chicago Tribune, a pastor in Illinois sold discount
medical cards to his parishioners.17
FIELD TEST OF DISCOUNT MEDICAL CARDS
To test how well discount medical cards work, the
authors in August, September, and October 2004
enrolled in, used, and disenrolled from five cards
that offered discounts for health care services in
the greater Washington, D.C., area. (See page 12
for complete study methodology.)
Enrollment Process
The authors found considerable variation in
enrollment experiences. Promoters of two of the
five cards gave detailed explanations of how the
cards work, how they differ from insurance, and how
they can be used in combination with insurance in
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certain circumstances.These promoters did not
pressure the researchers to enroll.
With three of the cards, however, the
authors experienced high-pressure sales tactics,
misleading and inaccurate benefit information,
and, in one case, a significant delay in receiving the
discount card and membership packet.The pro-
moters of these cards pressured the authors to
enroll by telling them that the open-enrollment
period was about to end and that the opportunity
to enroll, regardless of health status, would end
when open enrollment closed.They also said that
the price would increase unless the authors
enrolled immediately, or that the offer would
expire on the date of the call or within the week.18
These promoters also made misleading state-
ments about the cards. For example, one promoter
did not disclose that the discount card was not
insurance.When asked to clarify hospital discount
benefits, another promoter—who offered accident
coverage as a part of the discount card package—
confused the discount and the accident coverage
by stating that the authors would be covered for
$10,000 of hospital care.This promoter did not say
the insurance coverage was only for accidents.
Moreover, several promoters emphasized that all
preexisting conditions were “covered,” there were
no age limitations, and no one would be turned
down because of a health condition. By using
insurance terms and improperly explaining bene-
fits, some consumers could mistakenly believe they
are buying health insurance.
Three cards had an external verification
process under which the authors had to verify to a
third-party computer system that they had received
certain disclosures—for example, that the card is
not an insurance plan, and they consented to
enrollment. However, some promoters had devel-
oped ways to get around the process. One pro-
moter answered questions on behalf of the
author—without actually asking her.The author
was responsible only for stating her name and date
of birth. During this process, the author was
unable to hear most of the information being veri-
fied.When the author complained about this, the
promoter instructed her to hold her questions and
press a number on the keypad, indicating accept-
ance of the terms of agreement.The author could
not hear much of the subsequent recorded agree-
ment, but did hear information that contradicted
what the promoter promised about the refundabil-
ity and amount of the enrollment fee.
In some cases, the authors were told to
accept the terms of the agreement without actually
seeing it. One card company promised a follow-up
call to verify certain information, but never pro-
vided the follow-up.
Another enrollment problem encountered
was the length of time it took to receive the dis-
count card and information packet. In one case,
more than three weeks passed before the author
received these materials, making it impossible to
use the benefits for which the author has already
paid.The authors did receive information for four
of the five cards within one week of enrollment.
(See Appendix A for more information about the
enrollment process.)
Using Discount Cards
Once enrolled, the authors tested the cards to see
how well they worked.The most significant chal-
lenge was finding health care providers who
accepted the cards.Three cards did not provide a
list of providers prior to enrollment. Following
enrollment, each of these three card companies
gave the authors inaccurate information about
providers.As a result, the authors had to contact
these companies repeatedly to find participating
providers who would accept the card. In many
instances, the customer service agents supplied
incorrect phone numbers (including a number for
an auto garage). Even when the information pro-
vided was accurate, the authors had to contact the
companies repeatedly because providers either did
not accept the card or did not give discounts to
cardholders.
within 15 percent of the upper limit promised.
Discounts for the other two cards either were sub-
stantially less than promised or the authors were
not able to obtain estimates from the providers.
Two of the five cards promised an 80 percent dis-
count, but the authors were unable to find a
provider who offered such a discount.
In several cases, discounts were also available
to non-cardholding patients paying cash. One
provider gave uninsured patients a discount of $45
off the usual and customary fee of $155; the dis-
count for a cardholder would be only $10.21
Even when providers offered discounts, only
the two least expensive cards provided any measure
of value when the authors figured in the cost of
the monthly fee and enrollment fee.The two least
expensive cards did provide some level of savings.
For example, one card (monthly fee of $12.99 and
no enrollment fee) provided savings of $80 on an
annual gynecological exam and $25 on a routine
physical with a physician. Because the first 60 days
for this card cost only $1, the net savings equaled
$104. However, one drawback is that although
all providers contacted said that they participated,
not all were able to say what the amount of the
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In total, the researchers contacted 44 med-
ical providers. Of these, 16 honored the card, but
only nine provided an estimated discount. In one
case, the researchers contacted 12 providers whose
information was provided by the card company
and found that only one recognized and accepted
the card.19 Of the five cards tested, only one had a
100 percent record of providers offering discounts
to cardholders (Table 1).20
To determine how the discounts compared
to noncardholder rates, the authors asked the
providers for their regular price, the rate for an
uninsured individual paying cash, and the rate for
cardholders. Prices were compared for the follow-
ing medical events: standard annual physical from a
physician; standard annual gynecological visit (with
Pap test; lab fees not included); and an initial visit
to an allergist that included testing for allergies
(skin test/scratch test).
The level of discount varied from between
4 percent and 36 percent off the providers’ regular
rates. For two cards, the discount quoted was con-
sistent with what was promised in advertisements
and in the enrollment materials—within 10 per-
cent of the upper limit promised. One card was
Table 1. Reaching Providers
Number of Providers Number of Providers Promised Actual Discount for Cash-Paying
Card Able to Contact* Accepting Card Savings Discount or Uninsured Patient
1 9 of 12 1 15%–40% 30% None
2 6 of 9 4 15%–40% 20%–25% 2 of 4 providers;
amount varied, depending on
individual’s circumstance
3 7 of 7 7** Up to 40% 4%–34% None
4 5 of 9 3 50%–80% 6%–36% 2 of 3 providers;
amount varied for one provider,
depending on individual’s
circumstance; the other provider
gave 30% off (6% off to
discount cardholders)
5 4 of 7 1 25%–80% Estimate None
not provided
* We were not able to contact providers for one of two reasons: 1) the phone number was disconnected;
or 2) discount card company gave us incorrect contact information for the provider.
** One provider offered a discount for the first visit only.
Source:Authors’ review and analysis of a selected group of discount medical cards, 2004.
discount would be—making it difficult for con-
sumers to plan.
With the second, more expensive card
(monthly fee of $24.95 and $10 enrollment fee),
the authors saved $30 on a routine physical and
$94 on an annual gynecological exam.The net
savings were approximately $89.
Only one of these cards delivered on the
promised savings with each of the providers we
contacted.The second card did not have a 100
percent provider acceptance rate. Moreover, the
monthly cost of a card is not correlated with the
level of discount provided; that is, higher-priced
cards do not necessarily offer a greater discount.
Cancellation
Consumers must be able to cancel discount med-
ical cards on demand.The authors’ cancellation
experiences were mixed.They were able to cancel
four of the five cards without incident, although
one card reimbursed less than the amount prom-
ised (Table 2).Two cards permitted cancellation
over the phone, while the others required written
cancellation (one card accepted this correspon-
dence via e-mail).
The other card, however, was difficult to
cancel.This company tried to persuade the
researchers to stay enrolled by offering a free
month. It also gave inaccurate information about
cancellation procedures and failed to refund the
monthly fee in full, even though there was a 30-
day, money-back cancellation policy.The cancella-
tion process, contrary to information included in
the enrollment package, was complex.The com-
pany required a certified letter sent to one location
to notify the company of intent to cancel mem-
bership and another letter to a different address
in order to receive a refund of the first month’s
fees.
DISCUSSION
Consumers who enroll in discount medical cards
may receive inaccurate information during the
enrollment process, have trouble getting the care
they need at the promised discounts, and may
incur unexpected costs when disenrolling because
they do not receive promised refunds. Only one of
the five cards tested appeared to offer a net value,
meaning the discount on doctors’ services was
greater than the cost of the card and the card had
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Table 2. Getting a Refund After Cancellation
Amoung Promised Amount
Card Refund Policy Amount Paid to Refund Refunded
1 Refundable, $179.95 $179.95 $140
but inconsistent (monthly fee $89.95 and (Less than
information about enrollment fee $90) promised refund)
the amount of refund
2 Refundable* $34.95 0 0
(monthly fee $24.95 and
enrollment fee $10)
3 Refundable $1 $1 $1
(introductory rate for 60 days)
4 Enrollment fee $94.95 0 0
not refundable (monthly fee $44.95 and
Unclear if monthly enrollment fee $50)
fee is refundable
5 Refundable* $170 0 0
(monthly fee $50 and
enrollment fee $120)
* Monthly fee refundable only if cancelled within 30 days. Card number 2 was not canceled within 30 days. Card number 5 could not
be canceled within 30 days because enrollment and benefits information did not arrive for over three weeks.
Source:Authors’ review and analysis of a selected group of discount medical cards, 2004.
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a 100 percent rate of provider acceptance.
Although one other card produced savings, only
four of the nine providers accepted the card.
If the authors had kept the one card that did
offer value for six months (at a total cost of
$52.96), and they had one visit to a gynecologist
for an annual exam, the net savings would have
equaled $27.04 ($80 provider discount minus
$52.96 card cost for six months). If the authors
also received an annual physical from a physician
and visited an allergist (with allergy testing), the
savings would have been even greater. Four of the
five discount medical cards tested, on the other
hand, offered little value: high costs and small dis-
counts, coupled with the significant amount of
time and labor needed to find participating
providers, detracted from the potential value.22
Regulatory Issues
Discount medical cards are not insurance policies
and are therefore not regulated like insurance
products. Due to jurisdictional constraints and a
lack of specific laws, states have had limited success
in protecting consumers.
Types of regulations. Discount medical
cards and the companies that operate them are gen-
erally subject only to fraud and deceptive market-
ing prohibitions enforced by state attorneys general
after consumers report problems. Federal and state
health insurance standards—including regulation
of rates, requirements to have adequate provider
networks, advertising standards, and financial
integrity—do not apply.This regulatory vacuum,
coupled with consumers’ expectations, has created
opportunities for fraudulent behavior and practices
that would be prohibited in the insurance
industry.23
Unlike insurance departments that can help
prevent problems from occurring, state attorneys
general (AGs) only deal with problems after the
fact.To combat deceptive and unfair trade prac-
tices, an AG must bring a lawsuit, but only after
receiving a pattern of complaints. Lack of state
laws specifically regulating these cards makes it dif-
ficult to address problems even after they occur.
Consumer concerns. Consumers have
reported a range of problems to state attorneys
general and state insurance regulators. Florida’s
insurance regulators reported nearly 800 consumer
inquiries and complaints during a nine-month
period (June 3, 2003, to March 1, 2004).24
Reported problems included consumers who
believed they bought insurance, consumers who
paid for cards but never received the membership
package, providers who did not accept the cards,
and consumers who did not receive information
about who to contact with problems.25 According
to Maryland’s insurance department, most discount
card complaints are brought by consumers who
thought they purchased insurance.26
In New York, one discount card program
claimed “savings as high as 90 percent off the usual
and customary fee” in its advertisements.The New
York State AG’s office found that the claimed dis-
count was greatly exaggerated and that typical sav-
ings were closer to 15 percent off the usual rate.27
Other problems included an endorsement
by a nonexistent entity, false claims about the
number of providers participating, and a failure to
disclose important benefit information, including a
required prepayment of $1,000 for each projected
day in a hospital and a requirement to make pay-
ment in full within 30 days of a hospital stay.
According to the investigators, the hospitalization
benefit was illusory. In another case, the AG’s office
found that enrollees were required to have a work-
ing credit card. If cardmembers could not pay fully
at the time of the service, their credit cards would
be billed at a non-discounted rate.The AG also
found one case in which consumers paid drasti-
cally different rates for the same program—from
$54.95 per month to $120 per month.28
In addition, there have been reports of out-
right fraud, either selling cards without a provider
network—Montana has shut down 11 companies
that sold cards without a network—or marketing
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scams purporting to sell discount card programs.
Telemarketers purporting to sell discount medical
cards get personal information from unsuspecting
consumers and then inappropriately bill credit
cards or make bank account withdrawals.
Consequently, the Federal Trade Commission
issued a consumer alert warning people against
buying a discount card through a telemarketer.29
Additionally, there have been cases where a com-
pany selling discount cards has billed an individ-
ual’s credit cards or made withdrawals from his or
her bank account after the individual had cancelled
the discount card.30
State responses. Due to a lack of clear
standards and regulatory authority, many AGs and
insurance commissioners have focused on issuing
consumer alerts and educational pamphlets instead
of taking steps to change the business practices of
these companies.There are, however, a few notable
exceptions.
Several AGs’ offices have pursued actions
against discount cards using their authority under
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Acts. New
York’s AG has been very active in this regard,
investigating and bringing actions against discount
card companies for false and misleading practices,
as well as issuing guidelines to assist the industry in
creating advertising and marketing materials that
are lawful and nondeceptive.31 There is no penalty,
however, for companies that violate such guide-
lines.AGs in Kansas and Florida have also filed
lawsuits.32
Some states are attempting to regulate the
market.To date, 13 states require companies to dis-
close that a discount medical card is not insur-
ance.33 Additionally, a handful of states have specific
standards for advertisement and marketing. In eight
states, discount medical card programs are required
to contract separately with providers to address
concerns that providers are not aware of their par-
ticipation in the programs. However, in some cases
the standards are not clear as to whether a contract
between a PPO and a provider is sufficient to meet
the requirement for having a contract between the
provider and a discount card company.34
State insurance regulators and assistant AGs
have also identified the problem of discount card
companies not providing information regarding
companies’ locations, making it difficult to file a
civil action. Some states have begun to require
companies to disclose their location.35
Actions by state insurance regulators have
been limited, although a few states have used their
authority to shut down unauthorized insurers in
order to close down discount medical card compa-
nies. For instance, Montana’s insurance commis-
sioner shut down 11 discount card companies
operating in the state that falsely claimed to have
discounts with provider networks.36 In addition,
Oklahoma’s insurance department has shut down
several discount card companies.37 Insurance regu-
lators in these and several other states are seeking
legislative changes and expanded regulatory
authority over discount cards.
A more aggressive approach to protecting
consumers is just starting to emerge: licensing. In
2004, Florida passed a law requiring companies to
be licensed to operate a discount card program.
Such companies would need a minimum net
worth of at least $150,000 and be subject to a
background check for its operators (e.g., for felony
convictions).Additional requirements would
include supplying an up-to-date list of the names
and addresses of contracted providers, having their
rate approved by the insurance department when
the monthly fee is more than $30, meeting adver-
tising standards, and filing an annual report with
the Office of Insurance Regulation.38
In addition to these individual steps taken by
state attorneys general and insurance regulators, the
National Association of Attorneys General and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) each have established working groups to
study discount cards.The NAIC held a public
hearing in December 2004 to find ways to better
address reported consumer problems.39
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Industry responses. Several discount card
companies have formed a trade association called
Consumer Health Alliance (CHA).Although, as
in other industries, the member companies are
concerned about over-regulation, the companies
interviewed for this report are unanimous in their
belief that misleading marketing, as well as outright
fraud, gives the entire industry a bad reputation.
According to one card company’s CEO, CHA’s
goal is to “eliminate bad actors.” Referring to
companies that do not have contracts with providers
or networks, another CHA member said there are
“lots of bad players right now . . . total scams,” but
also said that “this is a wonderful product and should
be sold for what it is, not for what it’s not.”40
In response to some of the reported prob-
lems, CHA’s members have developed a voluntary
code of conduct. Under these standards, member
companies must provide a toll-free number for
enrollees to access information regarding providers,
rates, and discounts; have a statement disclosing
that the discount program is not insurance; have a
policy that allows cancellation within 30 days for a
full refund of all membership fees, excluding
enrollment fee; and provide information about a
company’s complaint process.The code also
requires companies to have contracts, with infor-
mation included on the discount program (e.g., the
amount of the discount or fee schedule) with par-
ticipating providers or networks.41
In addition, several CHA members have
adopted business practices that seek to address
problems of misrepresentation. For example, several
member companies employ a verification process
to ensure consumers understand the card is not an
insurance product and have realistic expectations of
discounts.To help prevent issues of false claims and
marketers who circumvent the verification process,
one CHA member company has discontinued the
use of network marketing to sell its products.
One major problem that consumers, as well
as the researchers of this project, have encountered
is that the providers supplied by the card compa-
nies do not accept the discount card. Partly this
can be attributed to PPOs who have contracted
with the card companies, as these companies do
not always notify providers about the program.
One CHA member company requires its con-
tracted PPO to notify participating providers about
the discount card program. Providers who do not
wish to offer discounts may then contact the com-
pany to be removed from the list of participating
providers.
In response to unauthorized charges or bank
account withdrawals, one company has kept billing
and payment in-house to help prevent unautho-
rized charges by others selling its program.To
avoid unreasonable monthly charges, this company,
a discount wholesaler, maintains control over price
when the program is resold.42
CONCLUSION
With few affordable health insurance options,
interest in discount medical cards will likely
increase.While there is insufficient information
available to determine if discount medical cards are
meeting consumers’ needs, the authors’ experience
with some discount cards raises serious concerns.
Issues included questionable and perhaps unlawful
marketing practices, a lack of available providers,
discount rates that were not as high as promised
(and that could possibly be achieved by non-card-
holders who negotiate directly with providers), and
disenrollment processes that are often complicated
and costly because promised refunds did not mate-
rialize.The authors’ experience is consistent with
the types of problems reported to and investigated
by state AGs and insurance commissioners.
Legislative action is needed that gives state
insurance departments the authority and resources
to have direct oversight of the discount medical
card industry. Creating regulations, like those that
govern insurers and their products, as well as spe-
cific standards applicable to discount medical cards,
would help prevent many consumer problems.
Specific standards for discount medical cards would
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also help state AGs to better protect consumers
after problems occur.Actions that could help pro-
tect consumers include the following:
 Require companies to be licensed with the
insurance department, to post a bond in case of
problems, and to undergo a background check.
Many states have been unable to track down the
source companies and fine them for deceptive
and fraudulent behavior. Licensing requirements
would require companies to disclose information,
making it easier for states to enforce their laws.
 Require companies to have contracts directly
with providers, not just with their PPO networks.
 If companies allow their programs to be resold
or marketed by promoters, then they must
maintain control over advertising and be held
accountable for misleading, deceptive, or fraudu-
lent information offered by promoters or agents.
 Discount medical card programs should be
required to provide clear, comprehensible con-
sumer disclosures prior to enrollment, as well as
in the enrollment documents. For example, reg-
ulators should require companies to clearly state:
a) that discount cards are not insurance; b) that
consumers are responsible for the entire bill,
either at the time of service or prepaid; and
c) that if the bill is not paid in full at the time
of service, then the discount is not available.The
companies should also explain that, unlike health
insurance, the discount card does not count
toward reducing a preexisting condition when
an individual buys health insurance. Once the
individual has a medical condition or needs
medical care, consumers may not be able to buy
health insurance.The disclosure should include
an accurate description of benefits, such as the
amount of the median discount instead of the
highest level, and the names of participating
providers in various zip code areas.
 Similar to insurance products, consumers should
have an opportunity to have a “free look”
period. If a consumer cancels, then both the
enrollment fee and the monthly fee ought to be
refunded. Cards should have clear refund policies.
 Just as insurer’s rates must be reasonable in rela-
tion to the benefits provided, discount cards
should also maintain standards for rates.
 States should consider a suitability standard.
Under such a requirement, an agent would have
to inform a low-income person that free or
reduced medical care may already be available
through community health centers or other pro-
grams. Discount medical cards should not be
sold to people who qualify for public health
insurance programs because, at best, the card
would duplicate discounts already available. For
low-income people who cannot afford to pay
for a provider visit at the time of service, savings
with a discount card are illusory.
These types of legislative and regulatory interven-
tions are necessary to better protect consumers.
Even with new laws, some companies will choose
not to be licensed. It is important that resources be
available for state agencies to find such companies
and hold them accountable. Unlike comprehensive
health insurance, discount medical cards alone do
not provide financial security or access to needed
medical care.43
NOTES
1 Dental or vision cards grew in prevalence partly because tradi-
tional health insurance did not cover these benefits and separate
insurance for such benefits was unaffordable for many. Employers
and individual consumers purchased cards for the discounts.
2 For example, Care Entrée, a large discount card company, has
contracted with Private Healthcare Systems, Inc. (PHCS), a
provider network company, providing enrollees with access to
400,000 physicians, hospitals, and laboratories, according to the
company. See Precis Inc.’s U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Form 10-k filing for fiscal year ending December 31, 2003, p. 5.
AmeriPlan USA, a company that recently added discounts on
physician services to its products (mostly dental and vision dis-
counts), contracts directly with providers. Interview with Dennis
Bloom, chairman and CEO of AmeriPlan USA,August 6, 2004.
3 Precis Inc.’s U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-k
filing for fiscal year ending December 31, 2003.This company
reports $2.8 million in members’ escrow accounts in 2003.
4 Interview with Dennis Bloom, chairman and CEO of AmeriPlan
USA,August 6, 2004.
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5 R. Kaiser,“Health Cards Fuel Mix-Ups,” Chicago Tribune Online
Edition, August 8, 2004, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com
(visited August 9, 2004); L. Kalis,“Health Insurance:Working
Without a Net,” Fortune Small Business, May 22, 2004.
6 See K. Pollitz, R. Sorian, and K.Thomas, How Accessible Is Individual
Health Insurance for Consumers in Less-Than-Perfect Health? (Menlo
Park, Calif.: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, June 15, 2001).
7 Others believe that discount health plans qualify as creditable
coverage. In fact, discount health plans do not qualify as creditable
coverage and therefore consumers would not receive credit for
this coverage to reduce an exclusion for a preexisting condition
once they enroll in a health insurance plan.
8 In New York, a product called “Health-Flex 2000” is available for
$379/month for family coverage.This includes hospital indemnity
insurance and a discount medical card for physician discounts.
Information available at http://www.artisthealthsource.org (visited
December 27, 2004).
9 Correspondence from Kathy Lannen, Executive Vice President,
Best Benefits, to Mila Kofman, November 17, 2004.
10 Precis Inc.’s U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-k
filing for fiscal year ended December 31, 2003, pp. 3, 36.
11 An insurance agent interviewed for this paper reports that com-
mission she was offered was 50% of the monthly fee charged for
the discount card (not a one-time commission). Interview with
Paula Wilson, October 1, 2004.
12 Precis Inc.’s U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-k
filing for fiscal year ended December 31, 2003, p. 35.
13 Multilevel marketing may add to substantial price increases. For
example, a discount card offered by one company directly to con-
sumers costs $54.95 per month, while the same card sold by a
marketer costs $120 per month for the exact same network and
benefits. See In the Matter of U.S. Capital Healthcard BFT, Inc.,
Attorney General of the State of New York,Assurance of
Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law §63(15), June 2002,
p. 9. Several large companies interviewed for this report do not
use network marketing. One sells its product to financial institu-
tions, insurers, and other clients who then market the card to
their existing clients or offer it as a free benefit, in the case of an
insurance company client.
14 Telemarketing script for Healthcare Advantage sent to an insur-
ance agent trying to recruit the agent to sell this product. (Script
on file with authors.)
15 Some promoters send unsolicited faxes. Fax blasting is prohibited.
16 For example, the American Diabetes Association provided infor-
mation on its Web page on a discount card called Care Entrée
(available at http://www.diabetes.org/home.jsp, visited November
18, 2004). Costco, a wholesale club, also now offers a discount
medical card to their members. Costco Web site available at
http://www.costco.com/Service/MemberService.aspx, visited
November 18, 2004. Discover credit card offers a discount med-
ical card (information available at http://www.discovercard.com/
discover/data/products/planplus.shtml, visited November 18, 2004).
See also In the Matter of U.S. Capital Healthcard BFT Inc., Attorney
General of the State of New York,Assurance of Discontinuance,
June 2002, p. 3 (Chamber of Commerce Association and Greater
New York Chamber of Commerce promoted U.S. HealthCard).
Some insurers offer discount cards as a free benefit to people
covered by their health insurance policies. Such no-cost cards
provide discounts on services not covered by insurance, e.g., plas-
tic surgery. In some cases, insurers sell discount cards as standalone
(without health insurance) products. Correspondence from K.
Wrege of America’s Health Insurance Plan to F. Dino, Chief
Actuary, Office of Insurance Regulation, Department of Financial
Services, Florida, October 18, 2004.
17 Kaiser,“Health Cards Fuel Mix-Ups,” 2004.
18 High-pressure sales tactics are not new.The New York Attorney
General’s Office documented high-pressure tactics used by several
discount card promoters in 2002. See In the Matter of U.S. Capital
Healthcard BFT Inc., June 2002, p. 8.
19 While reviewing state actions, we found that this company was
shut down by Montana’s insurance commissioner earlier in 2004
for not having provider networks and for operating illegally. In the
Matter of Continental Health, Temporary Cease and Desist Order,
Notice of Proposed Agency Action and Opportunity for Hearing,
State Auditor’s Office, Insurance Department of Montana.This
company continues to operate and sells coverage in other states.
20 Through interviews with members of the Consumer Health
Alliance we discovered that one of its members provided services
for this discount card. Subsequent to our calls to participating
providers, we asked the company for the discounted rates negoti-
ated with these providers to compare our findings with the nego-
tiated discounts. Because we did not have CPT codes, we could
not accurately compare the savings.
21 A summary of the authors’ experiences in contacting network
providers is available from the authors upon request.
22 Of the 27 cards looked at initially, the price for some was as high
as for health insurance policies; for example, one card’s annual cost
for single coverage would have been over $1,200, and for family
coverage over $1,550.
Additional research should be conducted to see if discount
medical cards would provide value for uninsured people with
ongoing medical needs. People who would be high users of
health care (who are not able to negotiate discounts on their
own) may realize a savings greater than the cost of the card.Also,
families (with more than one user) may realize a value from a dis-
count card.Additional research should also be done to determine
whether someone who needs a surgical procedure and does not
have insurance could benefit from a short enrollment (that is, if he
or she can afford to pay the amount of the surgery in full).
23 See M. Kofman, K. Lucia, E. Bangit, Health Insurance Scams: How
Government Is Responding and What Further Steps Are Needed (New
York:The Commonwealth Fund,August 2003).
24 Discussion with official from Florida Division of Financial
Services, November 10, 2004.
25 There have also been reports of people on Medicare buying dis-
count medical cards based on an erroneous belief that the discount
card gets one a better rate and thus the coinsurance amount is
less. Discussion with Bonnie Burns, California Health Advocates,
November 15, 2004.
26 Report of the Maryland Insurance Commissioner Regarding
Discount Card Plans, November 18, 2004. p. 2.
27 In the Matter of US Capital Healthcard BFT Inc., Assurance of
Discontinuance, New York Attorney General, June 2002, pp. 5, 9,
13-14; In the Matter of Medisavers, Inc. Assurance of
Discontinuance, New York Attorney General, July 2002, p. 9.
28 Ibid.
29 Consumer Alert:“Bogus Medical Discount Plans:A Bitter Pill,”
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, February 2003.
30 G. Britton,“Discount Medical Plans and the Consumer: Health
Care in a Regulatory Blindspot,” Loyola Consumer Law Review 16
(2004): 97–99.
31 Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General’s Advertising,
Marketing and Program Guidelines for Medical and Prescription
Discount Cards, 2004.
32 See Kansas Insurance Department press release,“Commissioner
Praeger and Attorney General Kline Unite to Fight Fraud,” 2004.
12 The Commonwealth Fund
See also “Agreement between Florida Attorney General and
MemberWorks Inc.” (settlement agreement), June 2004.
33 See “Summary Chart of State Medical and Pharmaceutical
Discount Plan Laws and Regulations,” (Washington, D.C.:
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2004).
34 Britton,“Discount Medical Plans,” 2004.
35 Ibid., p. 114.
36 In the Matter of United Family Healthcare Group, Case No.: 2004-
36,Temporary Cease and Desist Order, Notice of Proposed
Agency Action and Opportunity for Hearing, State Auditor’s
Office, Insurance Department of Montana, 2004; In the Matter of
Continental Health et al., Case No. 2004-31,Temporary Cease and
Desist Order, Notice of Proposed Agency Action and Opportunity
for Hearing, State Auditor’s Office, Insurance Department of
Montana, 2004; In the Matter of All American Health Care et al.,
Case No.: 2004-33,Temporary Cease and Desist Order, Notice of
Proposed Agency Action and Opportunity for Hearing, State
Auditor’s Office, Insurance Department of Montana, 2004.
37 State of Oklahoma v. Covenant Benefits Group, LLC. Case No. 04-
1610-DIS, Emergency Cease and Desist Order. 8 November
2004; State of Oklahoma v. Lifeguard Benefit Services, Inc., Case No.
04-1611-DIS, Emergency Cease and Desist Order. 8 November
2004; State of Oklahoma v. Quality of Life Health Corporation, Case
No. 04-1612-DIS, Emergency Cease and Desist Order. 8
November 2004.
38 Florida Statutes Title 37 Section Chapter 636 Part II (2004).
39 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners formed a
working group, which held a public hearing on December 6,
2004 (information available at http://www.naic.org).
40 Interview with Dennis Bloom, chairman and CEO of AmeriPlan
USA,August 6, 2004.
41 “Code of Conduct,” Consumer Health Alliance, 16 January 2003.
42 Interview with Kathy Lannen, Executive Vice President, Best
Benefits, November 9, 2004.
43 Fifty percent of personal bankruptcies relate to a medical condi-
tion. Many consumers are at risk of having no financial security
when lacking comprehensive health coverage. See M. Jacoby,T.
Sullivan, E.Warren,“Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care
Financing, Evidence From the Bankruptcy Courts” New York
University Law Review 76 (May 2001): 377.
STUDY METHODOLOGY
To test how well medical discount cards work, the authors enrolled in, used, and disenrolled from
selected medical discount cards on the market in August, September, and October 2004.The researchers
identified discount cards by searching the Internet; reviewing direct mail, fax, and e-mail solicitations;
and reading advertisements and articles in magazines and newspapers.Additional vendors were identi-
fied through a trade association called the Consumer Health Alliance (CHA), which represents some
companies that manage and administer discount cards.§ Altogether, the researchers identified 27 dis-
count medical card programs available to consumers nationally, according to their advertisement. (For
a complete list, see Appendix B.)
The researchers sought to enroll in cards that offered discounts for provider services in the
greater Washington, D.C., area (including Virginia and Maryland).They could not enroll in some cards
for the following reasons: disconnected telephone numbers; closed to new enrollment; no provider dis-
counts (contrary to information in advertisements); no discounts in the greater D.C. area; or the cards
were actually health insurance programs (contrary to information in advertisement).Additionally, they
chose not to enroll in two cards because of prepayment requirements that were too high or too risky.§§
Out of the nine cards remaining, the researchers selected five cards based on price range (i.e., $25 and
under, $26–$50, and over $50 per month) and source of initial information (Web, fax, direct mail, etc.).§§§
§ Some of CHA’s members offered to give us cards to test out.We chose not to because we wanted to go through a process that
a consumer would go through in finding and choosing a card.
§§ The number for this promoter was disconnected as of November 29, 2004.
§§§ One limitation to testing our cards is that we did not use a bank account and thus could not test out whether there would be
unauthorized withdrawals. During the enrollment process, we enrolled in one card under the researchers name, while enrolling
under the researcher’s spouse’s name for the other four discount cards. Because this report’s researchers have published and have been
quoted in the press on other research, we sought to avoid recognition as researchers. Hence, we used a researcher’s spouse’s name.
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Appendix A. Enrollment Information
Discount Discount Discount Discount Discount
Card #1 Card #2 Card #3 Card #4 Card #5
Initial Fees
Enrollment/other fees $90.00a $10.00 None $50.00 $120.00a
Monthly fee $89.95 $24.95 $12.99b $44.95 $50.00
Provider Network
List available prior to enrollment No Yes Yesc No No
Doctor/Hospital Services
Must pay physician at time of service Depends Depends Yes Yes No
on provider on provider
Must pay hospital at time of service Unclear No No hospital Yes Yesd
discounts
Waiting period for hospital services No 30-day No hospital No No
waiting period discounts
Marketing Tactics
Disclosure that this is not insurance No Yes Yes Yesa Yesa
Pressure to enroll (e.g., offer will Yes No No No Yes
expire, price will increase, or open
enrollment will soon end)
a There were inconsistencies between information received on the phone during the enrollment process with the information available
on the Web site and/or in printed literature.
b Paid $1.00 for first 60 days.
c The provider name was given as well as the toll-free number to find out who was in the network.
d Member must guarantee payment before any procedure. For hospital services, member must provide a guarantee of funds via certified funds if over $2,000.
14 The Commonwealth Fund
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 e
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to
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tio
n 
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ill
in
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ud
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 i
n 
th
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m
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th
ly
 r
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e.
**
*
W
ai
tin
g 
pe
ri
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s 
fo
r 
ho
sp
ita
l s
er
vi
ce
s,
w
hi
ch
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ea
ns
 a
n 
en
ro
lle
d 
pe
rs
on
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 p
ay
 a
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isc
ou
nt
ed
 r
at
e 
du
ri
ng
 a
 w
ai
tin
g 
pe
ri
od
.
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